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We consider a model where a worker's productivity must exceed some lower bound for him
to satisfy the minimum qualifications for a particular job. If the worker's productivity exceeds
some upper bound he is promoted. We assume the productivity of every worker increases with
experience, tenure and education. This relationship differs across workers.
We present distributions of workers with the property that, among workers on a particular
job, education, experience, or tenure is negatively correlated with productivity; even though for
any single worker on that job those demographic characteristics have strongly positive effects on
productivity. The result is due to the effect of the job assignment rule on the distribution of
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It is a commonplace observation that while earnings generally increase with
age, labor market experience, and education, performance within a job often
decreases with age, experience and education. (See for example, Medoff and
Abraham, Berg, Kutscher and Walker, or Clay.)
One reason for this apparent divergence between performance and earnings is
that the distribution of workers on a job is generally truncated from above and
below: there are usually hiring criteria that applicants must satisfy to be assigned
to that job (or to keep it), and there are usually also promotion criteria. Since
measures of productivity within a job are necessarily restricted to workers who
were assigned to those jobs and have not yet been promoted (or demoted), there is
aclearsample-selectionbiasoperating.For example, Medoff and
Abraham (1980a) find in an empirical study that better educated workers need to
achieve a lower level of productivity before being promoted than do less well
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educated workers.1 Hence, even if productivity were positively correlated with
education we could find that the better educated within a job (those who haven't
been promoted) are, on average, less productive than the less well educated
workers.
In this paper we prove a stronger point. Suppose job assignments were
determined solely by productivity (so that the same level of performance were
required for each worker's promotion) and productivity were an increasing function
of experience and education. The use of productivity as the sole criterion for
promotions could still cause a negative correlation between productivity and
experience (or education) within jobs. The reason is that although the productivity
of each individual increases with experience, the distribution of people by innate
ability changes across experience and education bands within a job. The lower
innate ability of the more experienced and better educated workers on a job could
outweigh the direct effect of experience and education on their performance, and
cause a negative correlation between experience (or education) and performance on
that job.
Our argument is based on a model in which productivity is linked to job
assignment. Such a linkage is explicitly formulated in models by Calvo and
Wellisz, Rosen, and Guasch and Weiss.
1. This could be explained if some of the learning in school has a greater effect on productivity in
higher level jobs than in lower level ones.-3-
In the Calvo-Wellisz model, shirking by supervisors is more harmful to the firm
than is shirking by production workers. Consequently the more able workers are
assigned to supervisory positions and are paid more (to increase their effort).
In the Rosen model, the production technology of the firm amplifies the
productivity of supervisors relative to that of production workers. The output of
supervisors affects the output of their subordinates. In equilibrium, the most
productive, and most highly paid, workers are assigned jobs higher up in the
corporate hierarchy..
In the Guasch-Weiss model, promotions of the more able workers are used as
sorting mechanisms to induce applications from workers of high ability.
II. THE MODEL
Assume a continuous distribution F(i) of individuals i€R in the population,
and denote F'(i) by f(i). The productivity of an individual I is ix where x
represents either experience or education (for ease of exposition we shall refer to x
as experience). Thus we are assuming that, for every individual, productivity
increases with x. We are concerned with the relationship between productivity and
experience on a particular job. Workers need a productivity of r to be assigned to
this job. When their productivity exceeds s they are promoted. Consequently, the
individuals with total labor market experience x who have this job are represented
by the band of abilities i for which
rxis. (1)-4-
We also allow for the possibility that the individual learns something on the job
that enhances productivity there, but not on other jobs. Let y be the time on the
job. Since, according to (1), the job begins when x =ni,and ends when x =s/i,
we have
y =x —n/i, (2)
0 <y (s—r)/i. (3)
We assume that productivity on the job for individuals of type i is given by
ix + aiy,
for some constant a. If a =0,there is no job-specific learning. To put this in
terms of the variable x, we substitute for y from (2), obtaining
ix + aiy =x(1+a)i —ar, (4)
in which, by (1), i is restricted to the range
nixisix. (5)
It is this fact, that longer experience x is associated with groups of lower ability,
that we wish to stress here.
By (4) and (5),theaverage productivity, AP(x), of workers on a particular job




six xIif(i)di —(1+a)"r/r —
fS/Xfd rJ'x















= r S +
r2rs





the first reduction obtained by removing the common factor x2(1/r— us)from
numerator and denominator, and the second by writingtheresult,
(A +BX)/(C+Dx),inthe form BID+(A —BC/D)/(C+Dx). As the final
expression decreases when x increases, the average product of labor on the job is a
decreasing function of total labor experience.
Thus for each individual, productivity increases with experience. However, in
the job-experience cohort being selected, the more experienced workers are less
productive.
Of course these results are sensitive to the distribution, F(i), of ability in the
population. For example, suppose that, within the relevant range of ability types,
f (1) =Ki,where K is a constant of normalization. Then given our learning
function and job assignment criterion, expected productivity within the job would
be independent of experience. (This result follows trivially from substituting into
(6)). Examples of distributions for which expected productivity increases with







Aswe already mentioned, this argument is directly applicable to the
relationship between productivity and education: we need only change the definition
of x. However, the relationship between productivity and experience can be
different when the measure of experience is y, tenure on the job, rather than x,
total work experience. By (2), expressing the productivity in terms of y yields
ix +aiy=y(l+a)i +r, (8)
where,by (3), 1 is restricted to the range
0i(s—r)/y, (9)
Here, because each year on the job contributes a year to total experience, observed
tenure on a job places an upper bound on innate ability, for individuals with ability
exceeding (s—r)/y would have been promoted out of the job before attaining
tenure y. On the other hand, tenure places no positive lower bound on the
productivity of individuals. In our model a person of arbitrarily low innate ability
could qualify for any job by dint of sufficiently long experience. On comparing (5)
and (9), we see that, even within a given job, sorting workers by x or by y yields
different ability groups. Consequently, average productivity on a job can vary







andfor the choice f(i) of (7) this now increases in y. However, if f(i) were a-8-
suitably scaled version of (i +i2), for i in a finite range, average productivity would
decrease as tenure on the job increases.
III. DISCUSSION
We have shown that sample selection can cause the measured relationship
between particular worker characteristics and productivity on a job to be the
reverse of what it actually is in the entire worker population. The distributions we
have chosen to illustrate this do not seem unreasonable. Moreover, there is
evidence that promotional criteria are less stringent for better educated workers,
which would tend to strengthen the bias further.
We thus conclude that lower productivity of more experienced or educated
workers within a job is consonant with human capital theory, which predicts that
productivity of any worker increases with experience and education.-9-
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